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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2

3
4

JOHN MOORE,

5
6

7
8

9
10

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

V.

No.S006987

)

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, a governmental
agency; DAVID GOLDE, M.D.; et
al.,

)
)
)
)
)
Defendants and Petitioners.
)
__________________________________________ )

11

12

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Consolidated Appeals From the Separate Judgments
of the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
The Honorable Warren H. Deering and John L. Cole, Judges
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Four
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 11, 1984, John Moore, a leukemia patient, sued

20 his physician, a medical researcher, the University of
21 California, and two pharmaceutical companies for the conversion
22 of his spleen, blood, bone marrow aspirates, and other bodily

23

substances ("Blood and Bodily Substances"), and for various other

24

causes founded on that allegation.

25

judge sustained three Defendants' demurrers to the third amended

26

complaint with leave to amend, and dismissed those Defendants

27

when Mr. Moore chose not to further amend his complaint.

28

months later a different trial judge sustained the demurrers of
1

After a hearing, the trial

Several

1

the two remaining Defendants without leave to amend, and

2

dismissed those Defendants, holding no recognized cause of action

3

existed for Mr. Moore’s claim of conversion, and that the court

4

did not wish to create a new cause of action.

5

Mr. Moore appealed the demurrers and on July 21, 1988, the

6

court of appeal reversed both lower courts.

7

the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230 (1988).

8

that:

9

sufficient as a matter of law to support a case of conversion;

Moore v. Regents of
The court held

(1) a person has a property right in his own bodily tissues

10

(2) merely by consenting to removal of his spleen, Mr. Moore had

11

not impliedly abandoned his organ, blood or tissue; and (3) Mr.

12 Moore did not consent to either research unrelated to treatment
13 or commercial exploitation of his unique genetic material.

14

at 1244-1256.

15

by the first trial court for sustaining the demurrers were

16

appropriate.

17
18

November 10, 1988.

19

Id.

The court also held that none of the grounds given

Id. at 1255-1260,

This court granted review on

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Moore’s unique blood and blood components have

20 substantial commercial value and have provided, and will continue
21 to provide, significant financial and competitive advantage to

22 anyone exercising control over them.

23

(C.T. 2.)

Mr. Moore was diagnosed as having hairy-cell leukemia in

24

September 1976.

25

concerning his condition, he traveled from Alaska to the

26

University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA") Medical Center

27

where he was seen by Defendant Golde and other employees of the

28

Regents of the University of California ("Regents") in October

(C.T. 4.)

Seeking an additional opinion

2

1

1976.

(C.T. 4-5.)

2

The Defendants examined Mr. Moore on October 5, 1976 and, in

3

the following days, withdrew extensive amounts of his blood, bone

4

marrow aspirates and other bodily substances.

5

Defendants confirmed the diagnosis of hairy-cell leukemia and

6

recommended further treatment including the surgical removal of

7

Mr. Moore's spleen.

8

9

(C.T. 5.)

(C.T. 6.)

On October 19, 1976, Mr. Moore signed a consent form
authorizing surgeons at UCLA Medical Center to remove his spleen.

10

(C.T. 8.)

11

spleen and, without his consant, transported a portion of it to a

12

separate research unit of the UCLA School of Medicine for the

13

purpose of conducting non-therapeutic, commercial research.

14

(C.T. 9.)

15

activities had any relation to Mr. Moore's medical treatment.

16

(C.T. 6.)

17

On October 20, 1976, Defendants removed Mr, Moore's

Aside from the removal of the spleen, none of these

Following the operation. Defendants represented to Mr. Moore

18

that follow-up visits were necessary for his health and well

19

being.

(C.T. 12.)

Accordingly, he made at least eleven trips

20 from his home in Seattle, Washington to Defendants' facilities in
21 Los Angeles between October 1976 and September 1983.

(C.T. 11.)

22 During these visits. Defendants withdrew large quantities of Mr.

23

Moore's Blood and Bodily Substances.

24

Defendants' repeated representations, these withdrawals were not

25

made in furtherance of Mr. Moore's treatment, but rather to

26

advance their own commercial efforts.

27
28

(C.T. 12.)

Contrary to

(C.T. 12.)

Using Mr. Moore's tissues. Defendants established several
valuable products and cell-lines, including the "Moore cell-line"
3

1

and the "Mo cell-line."

2

lines "were not developed or derived through any extraordinary or

3

unusual scientific genius or methodology invented or employed by

4

[D]efendants."

5

cells was merely sustained using a growth medium commonly

6

employed in the biotechnology industry.

7

(C.r. 16.)

These products and cell

Rather, the growth of Mr. Moore's

(C.T, 34.)

(C.T. 34.)

Without Mr. Moore's consent. Defendants disseminated samples

8

of cell-lines and products derived exclusively from Mr. Moore's

9

tissues to a variety of commercial research firms throughout the

10

world.

11

whether Defendants had discovered anything of present or

(C.T, 16.)

During this period, Mr. Moore inquired as to

12 potential commercial value ccncerning his tissues.

(C.T. 14.)

13

Defendants repeatedly denied any such discoveries and, in fact,

14

actively discouraged such inquiries.

15

time. Defendants were aware that competing commercial firms in

16

the biotechnology industry had predicted a potential market of

17
18

approximately three billion dollars for a whole range of products

19

(C.T. 14.)

derived exclusively from Mr. Moore's tissues.

Yet, at this

(C.T. 25.)

In May 1981, Defendants Golde, the Regents, and Genetics

20 Institute entered into a contract which focused solely on the
21 commercial exploitation of the cell-lines and products

22 originating from Mr. Moore's body.

(C.T. 22.)

This contract

23

provided that Genetics Institute would pay Defendants Golde and

24

the Regents at least $330,003.00 over a three-year period for the

25

cell-lines obtained from Mr. Moore's body.

26

contract was later modified to include Defendant Sandoz, Inc.

27

("Sandoz"), giving Sandoz exclusive rights to the development of

28

Mr. Moore's cell-lines and the products originating from his
4

(C.T. 22.)

This

1

body.

2

(C.T. 23.)
In an attempt to gain exclusive legal rights to the control

3

of the "Mo cell-line," the Regents applied for a patent in May

4

1979.

5

patent application on the sane cell-line, abandoning their first

6

application later that same year.

7

a patent for the "Mo cell-line" was granted to Defendants Golde

8

and Shirley Quan (a researcher employed by Regents), and

(C.T. 17.)

On January 6, 1983, the Regents filed a second

(C.T. 23.)

On March 20, 1984,

9 concurrently a partial assignment was made to the Regents.

10
11

(C.T.

29. )
In an effort to prevent Mr. Moore from discovering these

12 commercial activities. Defendants renamed certain valuable cell
13 lines and products from "Moore," "Mo," and "Mo-B" to "RLC."
14

(C.T. 23.)

Yet Mr. Moore contends that, had he known the truth

15 concerning Defendants’ activities and the value of his tissues,

16

he would have insisted upon retaining control over the ultimate

17 use and disposition of them.

18

(C.T. 32.)

On April 11, 1983, Defendants first presented Mr. Moore with

19 a form requesting consent to the use of his tissues for research
20 apparently related to his disease.

2l

(C.T, 25.)

By this time.

Defendants had conducted more than five years of non-therapeutic

22 and commercial research, entered into several commercial
23 contracts, and filed two patent applications concerning
24 Mr. Moore's cell-lines.

(C.T. 25.)

Under the belief that such

25 consent merely authorized Defendants to perform purely academic
26 and non-commercial research, Mr. Moore consented to the use of

27 his tissues for these limited purposes.

28

(C.T. 26.)

Mr. Moore's final visit occurred on September 20, 1983.
5

1

(C.T. 26.)

2

form, Mr. Moore indicated in writing that he specifically did not

3

voluntarily grant to the Defendants "any and all rights

4

[he] . .

5

which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow

6

obtained from [him],"

7

obtain rights to Mr. Moore's tissues was made a full nine months

8

after they had submitted their second patent application on a

9

cell-line derived from Mr. Moore's tissues.

At this time, when confronted with a modified consent

. may have in any cell-line or other potential product

(C.T. 51.)

This attempt by Defendants to

(C.T. 23.)

Fully

10

aware of Mr. Moore's express refusal to consent to the commercial

11

exploitation of his biological material. Defendants continued

12 their commercial activities by using tissues withdrawn from him

13
14
15

on the very day of his refusal.

On September 11, 1984, Mr. Moore instituted a lawsuit based
on these events.

16
17

(C.T. 28.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On this appeal of Defendants' demurrers, the facts alleged

18

in Mr. Moore's complaint are to be taken as true.

19

these facts are sufficient to plead a cause of action for

20 conversion.

The three elements of conversion are:

As alleged,

(1)

21 plaintiff's ownership of the property at the time of the

22 conversion; (2) defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or

23

disposition of plaintiff's property; and (3) damages.

24

Marine City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978)

25

(citation omitted).

26

Baldwin v.

The foregoing elements have been sufficiently plead in the

27

Instant case.

28

exercise its well-precedented authority to include human

First, policy considerations compel the court to

6

1

biological material within the expansive statutory definition of

2

property.

3

of his property rights in his tissues by engaging in commercial

4

exploitation of their unique characteristics without his

5

knowledge or consent.

6

compensation for his contribution to the multi-billion dollar

7

industry based on his unique genetic material. Defendants have

8

caused Mr. Moore compensable damage.

9

Second, Defendants wrongfully dispossessed Mr. Moore

Third, by depriving Mr. Moore of any

At no time did Mr. Moore abandon his tissues.

In fact, Mr.

10

Moore's express refusal to grant Defendants commercial rights to

11

his tissues and derivative products evidences his intent to

12 retain dominion over them.

Also, as a result of Defendants'

13

statements, Mr. Moore held the reasonable expectation that his

14

tissues would be used solely in connection with his medical

15

treatment and then disposed of in accordance with the relevant

16

provisions of the Health and Safety Code.

17

retain dominion and his reasonable expectation as to the

18

disposition of his tissues are sufficient to dispute Defendants'

19

claim that he intended to abandon his tissues.

Mr. Moore's intent to

Therefore, the

20 issue of abandonment cannot be decided as a matter of law.
21

Moreover, Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the

22 necessity of the withdrawals of Mr. Moore's biological material

23

and the nature of their subsequent research.

24

to give specific instructions concerning the use of his tissues

25

was based upon his justifiable reliance on these

26

misrepresentations.

27

asserting that this silence constitutes proof that Mr, Moore

28

abandoned his tissues.

Mr. Moore's failure

Therefore, Defendants are estopped from

7

1

Mr. Moore does not contest Defendants' removal or use of his

2

tissues for therapeutic research purposes.

3

not expressly or impliedly consent to their commercial

4

exploitation of his tissues.

5

misrepresentations that they had no knowledge of any commercial

6

activities or commercial potential associated with Mr. Moore's

7

tissues would vitiate any such consent.

8

affirmative defense of consent fails.

9
10

Nevertheless, he did

Moreover, Defendants' fraudulent

Therefore, Defendants'

ARGUMENT
I.

11

BY COMMERCIALLY EXPLOITING MR. MOORE'S BIOLOGICAL
MATERIAL WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT,
DEFENDANTS HAVE COMMITTED THE TORT OF CONVERSION.

12

The gravamen of Mr. Moore's complaint against the Defendants

13

is a cause of action for conversion of his Blood and Bodily

14

Substances.

15

exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal

16

chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their

17

condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights."

18

Dictionary 300 (5th ed. 1979).

19

of action for conversion, the following must be shown:

20

plaintiff[*s] ownership or right to possession of the property at

21

the time of the conversion; (2) defendants' conversion by a

Conversion is "[a]n unauthorized assumption and

Black’s Law

Thus, in order to plead a cause
"(1)

22 wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff['s] property rights; and

23

(3) damages."

24

Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978) (citation omitted).

25

Baldwin v. Marine City Properties, Inc., 79

Mr. Moore's suit alleges that: (1) a patient has a property

26

right in the ultimate use and disposition of Blood and Bodily

27

Substances removed in the course of medical treatment; (2)

28

Defendants wrongfully engaged in the commercial exploitation of
8

1

the unique characteristics of Mr. Moore’s Blood and Bodily

2

Substances without his knowledge or consent; and (3) Mr. Moore

3

suffered significant damages in that he received no compensation

4

for his contribution to a multi-billion dollar product line that

5

would not have been possible but for his unique biological

6

material.

7

the Second District Court of Appeal, which held that Mr. Moore

8

sufficiently plead a cause of action for conversion of his Blood

9

and Bodily Substances.

10
11
12

Therefore, this court should affirm the decision of

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1258 (1988).
A. Mr. Moore has a property right in the ultimate
use and disposition of his Blood and Bodily
Substances removed in the course of medical
treatment.

13
14

A medical patient retains a right to determine the ultimate

15 use and disposition of organs, blood, and other bodily substances
16 removed in the course of prescribed medical treatment.

While

17 such a proposition may at first blush seem beyond dispute, the
18 denial of this most basic right lies at the heart of the defense
19 to Mr. Moore's suit.

20

The Defendants duplicitously suggest that,

while Mr. Moore has no property rights in his own bodily tissues,

21 they, on the other hand, may use Mr. Moore’s bodily tissues in

22
23

any manner they see fit.
Notwithstanding a paucity of legal authority or public

24 policy considerations to support Defendants' assertions, they
25 steadfastly maintain that the source of the material from which

26

the "Mo cell-line" was derived enjoys no proprietary interest.

27 To the contrary, the weight of legal authority and public policy

28

considerations support the recognition of Mr. Moore's claim to a
9

1

property interest in his own biological material.

2

1,

3
4

Human biological material is subsumed by the term
property.

The term property is "commonly used to denote everything

5

which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal,

6

tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal;

7

everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make

8

up wealth or estate."

9

(emphasis added).

Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 1979)

A similarly expansive definition of property

10

is found in Civil Code section 654 which states:

11

of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use

12

it to the exclusion of others. . . . [T]he thing of which there

13

may be ownership is called property."

14

1970).

15

"The ownership

Cal. Civ. Code S 654 (West

Thus, in legal terms, "property" does not refer merely to

16

tangible goods, but rather to a collection of legal rights.

17

a broad definition has required the courts to determine where

18

property rights are to be reoognized.

19

devolves upon the court to fill in the definitional vacuum [of

20 property]."
21

Such

As one court noted: "It

First Victoria Nat’l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d

1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980).

Consequently, "law and custom may

22 create property rights where none were earlier thought to exist."

23

Id. at 1103.

24

one's own biological material is within the court's inherent

25

authority to give substance to the statutory definition of the

26

term "property."

27

///

28

///

Therefore, recognition of a property interest in

10

1

2.

The right to exercise dominion and control
over one's biological material is
recognized by California statutes.

2

3

One characteristic normally associated with property is its

4

devisability.

5

right to devise the human body or body parts has been recognized

6

under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA").

7

Safety Code SS 7150-7156.5 (West Supp. 1989).

8

"[a]n individual who is at least 18 years of age [to] make an

9

anatomical gift ... or [to] refuse to make an anatomical gift."

First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 620 F.2d at 1103.

The

Cal. Health &
The UAGA allows

10

Id. S 7150.5(a).

11

7150.5(b).

12

for the underlying basis for the UAGA is to facilitate the supply

Such a gift may be made by will.

Id. S

Admittedly, the LJAGA provides an imperfect paradigm,

13 of donated organs for transplantation.

Nevertheless, by allowing

14 prospective donors to control the ultimate use and disposition of
15 their organs after death, the UAGA supports recognition of Mr.
16 Moore's property rights in his own tissues.
17

18

Furthermore, Penal Code section 367f, which proscribes the
sale of human organs for transplantation under certain

19 circumstances, "[does] not apply to the person from whom the

30

organ is removed."

3l

contrary to Defendant Golde's repeated assertions that it is a

Cal. Penal Code S 367f(e) (West 1988).

Thus,

32 crime to sell any non-regenerative human organ, in fact, the

33^

Penal Code does not prevent any individual from receiving

34 consideration for the removal of his or her own organ.
35 (Petitioner's brief at 7, 13, 17).
36

Defendant Golde also argues that, because the "disposition

37 of human tissue and parts is subject to regulation of the

38

state[,] [it] cannot be accorded full ownership."
11

(Petitioner's

1

brief at 16).

2

because something is subject to regulation does not mean that it

3

is not subject to ownership (e.g., cars, restaurants, airlines,

4

and firearms are all subject to regulation, yet they may still be

5

owned).

6

(e.g., the UAGA and Penal Code provisions) support the

7

recognition of Mr. Moore's right to determine the use and

8

disposition of his Blood and Bodily Substances.

This is nothing more than a non sequitur.

Merely

As noted above, the regulations relating to body parts

9

3.

Compensation of donors of human biological
material is well-precedented.

10
11

The sale of unique bodily substances is not without

12 precedent.

In United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.

13

1979), a Florida woman whose blood contained a rare antibody was

14

paid $200.00 per week, a $25,000.00 bonus, and provided with a

15

leased automobile.

16

Pennsylvania reportedly was paid $150.00 for supplying 10 grams

17
18

of nonregenerative thigh muscle.

Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 842, 845 n.21

19

(1973).

Similarly, a student of the University of

Comment, Tax Consequences of

Thus, not only was Mr. Moore denied the opportunity to

20 refuse to participate in Defendants' commercial exploitation of
21 his biological material, he was also denied the customary

22 compensation for providing Defendants his unique bodily

23
24
25
26
27
28

substances.
4.

The right of publicity is akin to the right to
control the ultimate use of one's biological
material.

The "right of publicity" is perhaps the most closely
analogous right to that which Mr. Moore seeks to have recognized.
For both acknowledge a right to very personal attributes of an
12

1

individual (i.e., one's persona and one's genetic material).

2

right of publicity recognizes a property interest in a person's

3

name, likeness, characteristics, or activities.

4

2d Property S 8 (1984); see also Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139

5

U.S. 540, 544 (1891) ("A man's name is his own property, and he

6

has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to any

7

other species of property.").

8

protect the economic interests of celebrities by preventing the

9

unjust enrichment of those who would capitalize on the fame of

See 63A Am. Jur.

This right has been invoked to

10

others without affording them just compensation.

11

Playqirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp- 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

12

The

See Ali v.

The right of publicity has been deemed assignable and

13

transferable.

14

836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

15

whether or not the right of publicity is survivable.

16

(right of publicity not terminated upon death of the person); cf.

17

Lugosi

18

to exploit one's name and likeness found to be "personal to the

19

artist" and therefore this right did not survive him).

20

V.

Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
However, courts have differed as to
See id.

Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824 (1979) (right

Regardless of whether the right of publicity survives the

21 individual, the recognition of this property right has important

22 Implications for the instant case.

For if a proprietary interest

23

can be found in such superficial characteristics as one's

24

likeness and persona, it cannot be denied that a patient's right

25

to his own genetic material, the very essence of his

26

individuality, is deserving cf any less protection.

27
28

Defendant Golde criticizes the applicability of the right of
publicity on the grounds that:
13

(1) the court decisions discussing

1

that right did not "consider whether physical body parts and

2

tissues are entitled to encompass these same rights"; and (2) the

3

right of publicity is distinguishable because an artistic

4

identity is "carefully contrived."

5

15).

(Petitioner’s brief at 14-

6

The initial argument, while true, is superfluous and does

7

not deny the incongruity of recognizing property rights in one

8

personal attribute (e.g., one's persona), but not in another

9

(e.g., one's unique genetic material).

The second argument lacks

10

proper foundation.

11

nor basis in logic, for the proposition that only that which is

12

"carefully contrived" is deserving of the protection of property

13

law.

Defendant Golde cites no authority in law,

In fact, precious minerals under one's land cannot be said

14 to have been "carefully contrived," yet they are still subject to
15 the dominion and control of the owner of the land (even if that
16 owner is unaware of their value).
17

5. Policy considerations support recognition of a
property interest in one's biological material.

18
19

20

The growth of the biotechnology industry has significantly
altered the value of the human body.

And while the prospect of

21 the commercialization of human tissue may appear objectionable to

22

some, the fact remains that researchers and biotechnology

23 corporations will continue to profit by patenting cell-lines and
24 products derived from human cells.

Thus, the real issue is

25 whether the sources of the material for this industry will be

26

allowed to share in the derivative profits made possible by their

27 unique biological material.
28

Notions of equity and fairness support the view that
14

1

traditional principles of property law should apply to protect

2

the donors of biological material.

3

allow some to profit by the commercial exploitation of human

4

cells (e.g., researchers, physicians, and biotechnology

5

corporations), while the sources of the vital raw material are

6

denied just compensation for their contribution.

7

doctrine of prior possession, a researcher who asserts a property

8

interest in the cells of a dcnor (e.g., by seeking to patent a

9

derivative cell-line) would be subject to the claims of the donor

It is patently unfair to

Under the

10

as prior possessor.

11

(K.B. 1722) (party who finds property has a superior right of

See Armcry v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 665

12 possession above all others except the true owner).

The

13

recognition of the right of prior possession appropriately

14

recognizes the relative contributions of the researchers and

15

donors.

16

who would otherwise be able to commercially exploit a donor's

17

unique biological material without providing any form of

This rule also prevents the unjust enrichment of those

18 compensation.

19

A disturbing aspect of the emergence of commercialization of

20 human cells is the direct participation of the physician in such
21

activities.

As typified by the behavior of Dr. Golde in the

22 instant case, the treating physician has a strong motivation to

23

withhold material Information from the patient.

24

disclose to the patient the true commercial potential of a

25

patient’s cells, the physician seeks to avoid a protracted legal

26

dispute over control of the patient's biological material.

27

situation breeds mistrust between patient and physician and

28

resentment by the patient whose fundamental contribution is not
15

By refusing to

This

1

2

recognized.
Acknowledging a patient's right to control the ultimate use

3

of his cells would require the physician to be forthright in

4

obtaining the informed consent of the patient to commercial

5

exploitation of the patient's cells.

Recognition of this right

6 would also obviate the resentment which a patient would hold
7

toward a physician who was seen to profit from the nonconsensual

8

exploitation of the patient's biological material.

6.

9
10
11

Summary

Support for Mr. Moore's claim to a protectable property
interest in his own biological material has been based on:

(1)

12 the broad authority of the court to give substance to the term

13

"property"; (2) the provisions of the UAGA which acknowledge the

14

right of a donor to determine the ultimate use and disposition of

15

certain bodily parts after death; (3) precedent for the sale of

16

both regenerative and non-regenerative bodily tissues; (4) an

17

examination of the closely analogous "right of publicity"; and

18

finally (5) policy considerations which weigh in favor of the

19

recognition of a property interest in one's own biological

20 material.

For these reasons, Mr. Moore has properly alleged a

21 property interest in his Blood and Bodily Substances, and

22 therefore the reversal of the demurrers by the court of appeal

23

was correct.

24

B.

25

Defendants wrongfully engaged in the commercial
exploitation of the unique characteristics of Mr.
Moore's Blood and Bodily Substances without his
knowledge or consent.

26
27

Whereas conversion is a strict liability tort, it is

28

unnecessary to delve into the intent of Defendants in order to
16

1

establish the act of conversion.

2

Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 149 (1978).

3

the mere ’’wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff ['s] property

4

rights" by the Defendants which must be shown to plead a cause of

5

action for conversion.

6

79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 410 (1978).

7

is whether Defendants interfered with Mr. Moore's property

8

interest in his biological material by commercially exploiting

9

his unique tissue without his knowledge or consent.

10
11

See City of Los Angeles v.
Rather, it is

Bald>;in v. Marine City Properties, Inc.,
Therefore, the critical issue

Mr. Moore concedes that Defendants had a right to examine
his tissue for therapeutic and general research purposes.

Such

12 authorization was confirmed by Mr. Moore's written consent during

13

his September 1983 visit to JCLA.

14

Moore relinquish his rights to cell-lines and products derived

15

from his tissues to Defendants,

16

refused to grant to Defendants any such interest as evidenced by

17

the same September 1983 written consent form.

18
19

However, at no time did Mr,

In fact, Mr. Moore expressly

(C.T. 51.)

Notwithstanding Mr. Moore's clearly expressed desire to
retain control over his biological material. Defendants obtained

20 a patent to a cell-line and other products derived from Mr.
21 Moore's unique tissue.

The wrongful conduct of Defendants

22 thereby deprived Mr. Moore of any further control over the

23

ultimate use and disposition of his unique biological material

24

without any compensation.

25

interfered with Mr. Moore's property right in his own biological

26

naterial and are hence liable for conversion.

27

///

By doing so. Defendants substantially

28 U/
17

1

C.

2

3
4

Where Mr. Moore's unique biological material
is used by Defendants, without compensation^
to produce commercially valuable substances,
his damages may be found to be substantial.

With respect to damages, California law provides:

5

The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion
of personal property is presumed to be:

6

First - the value of the property at the time
of the conversion, with the interest from that
time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify

7
8

the party injured for the loss which is the
natural, reasonable and proximate result of the
wrongful act complained of and which a proper
degree of prudence on his part would not have
averted.

9
10
11
12

13

Cal. Civ. Code S 3336 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
An important factor to consider in determining the value of

14

Mr. Moore's tissues is that the underlying value of the market

15

for derivative products lies in the unique ability of his tissues

16

to produce large quantities of commercially valuable substances.

17

Although Defendants have sought to minimize the importance of Mr.

18

Moore’s biological material in the development of the cell-line

19

and other commercial byproducts, the facts belie the notion that

20

it was they who gave value to Mr. Moore's otherwise worthless

21

tissues.

In fact. Defendants merely employed non-unique and non

22 extraordinary scientific processes to create the "Mo cell-line"

23

by taking Mr. Moore's spleen and cells and placing them in a

24

growth medium.

25

it must be noted that:

26
27
28

To place Defendants' contribution in perspective,

The ability to manipulate human cells into a
continuously growing cell culture in the
laboratory to produce a "cell-line" requires
a certain level of competence and expertise.
This ability, however, is not scarce among
IB

those familiar with genetic engineering.
Therefore, causing cells to grow continuously
is not a trait that would warrant patent
protection absent other unusual traits of the
cells.

1

2

3
4
5

Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality; Recognizing Property
Rights in the Commercial Valae of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev.
207, 222 n,77 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Toward the Right of
Commerciality] (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

6

7

Therefore, the true source of the value of Defendants'

8

patented cell-line and derivative byproducts lies in Mr. Moore's

9

unique biological material which made the "Mo cell-line"

10

possible.

11

Defendants would not have been able to derive the patented cell

12

line.

13

the cell-line using the same commonly employed methods used by

14

Defendants.

15

In essence, without Mr. Moore's unique cells.

In fact, numerous other researchers could have developed

Although determination of the market value of human tissues

16

is not something with which the courts are familiar, estimates of

17

the market value of cell-lines and products originating from Mr.

18

Moore's body have been made and their validity can be examined

19

through expert testimony at trial.

Thus, the trier of fact may

20 consider the testimony of biotechnology experts and economists in
21

order to determine the appropriate value of Mr. Moore's unique

22 biological material.

The essential inquiry concerns the value of

23

Mr. Moore's unique biological material to a biotechnology firm

24

that could have used the material, with the consent of the donor,

25

to develop highly beneficial and commercially valuable products.

26

Such testimony would provide the basis for determining Mr.

27

Moore's compensatory damages.

28

In addition to Defendants’ liability for compensatory
19

1

damages. Civil Code section 3294 entitles a plaintiff to

2

exemplary damages "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation

3

not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of

4

oppression, fraud, or malice."

5

Supp. 1989).

6

"[e]xemplary damages are properly awarded in an action for

7

conversion, given the required showing of malice, fraud or

8

oppression."

9

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Cal. Civ. Code S 3294 (West

Furthermore, this court has recognized that

Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 681 (1941)
Whereas Defendants

10

misrepresented the true nature of their commercial exploitation

11

of Mr. Moore’s unique biological material in response to his

12

inquiries, a finding of fraud by the Defendants would thus

13

entitle Mr. Moore to an award of exemplary damages as well.

14

(C.T. 13-14.)

15

II.

17

DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF
ABANDONMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND BY THEIR
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, THEY ARE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THAT MR. MOORE’S SILENCE CONSTITUTED
ABANDONMENT.

18

Mr. Moore's simple consent to removal of his tissues did not

16

19

constitute abandonment as a matter of law.

Abandonment is

20 defined as the "voluntary giving up of a thing by the owner
21

because he no longer desires to possess it or assert any right or

22 dominion over it and is entirely indifferent as to what may

23

become of it or as to who may thereafter possess it."

24

Cassidy, 149 Cal. App. 2d 106, 110 (1957) (citation omitted).

Martin v.

25

"The primary elements of abandonment are the intention to

26

abandon and the external act by which the intention is carried

27

into effect.

28

and paramount inquiry."

The intention to abandon is considered the first
Pickens v. Johnson, 107 Cal. App. 2d
20

1

778, 787 (1951).

2

elements have been alleged as a matter of law.

3

A.

Defendants fail to demonstrate that these

5

Mr. Moore's express refusal to grant Defendants
any and all rights to his tissues, coupled with
his reasonable expectations as to their use and
disposition, preclude a determination of
abandonment as a matter of law.

6

The question of intent to abandon may only be treated as a

4

7

question of law when there is no dispute as to the facts or

8

inferences to be drawn therefrom.

9

App. 2d 314, 316 (1925).

Herbert v. Graham, 72 Cal.

Where a dispute exists, the issue is to

10

be resolved by the finder of fact, based upon "all the facts and

11

circumstances of the case."

12

App. 2d 196, 199 (1936).

13

issue of abandonment in this case should be decided by the trier

14

of fact.

Peal v. Red Gulf Cedar Co., 15 Cal.

For the reasons indicated below, the

15

In September 1983, Defendants presented Mr. Moore with a

16

consent form wherein he declined to "voluntarily grant to the

17

University of California any and all rights [he] . . . may have

18

in any cell-line or any other potential product which might be

19

developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from [him]."

20

(C.T. 26-27.)

21

rights to his biological material on the only occasion he was

Mr. Moore thereby denied Defendants the commercial

22 given an opportunity to state a preference.

This denial is

23 strong evidence that he was not at all indifferent as to the
24 disposition of his tissues (i.e., he had not abandoned them).
25

Moreover, Mr. Moore held reasonable expectations concerning

26 the disposition of his tissues which preclude a finding that he
27 intended to abandon them.

In the absence of specific

28 instructions from Mr. Moore concerning the use of his biological
21

1

material, the most logical way for the finder of fact to

2

determine his unspoken intent is to examine the reasonable

3

expectations of a medical patient under these circumstances.

4

Defendants stated to Mr. Moore that the removal of his

5

spleen and the subsequent withdrawals of his Blood and Bodily

6

Substances were necessary for his health and well-being.

7

5, 11.)

8

that his tissues would be examined by Defendants solely in

9

furtherance of his medical treatment.

10

(C.T.

It would therefore be reasonable for Mr. Moore to expect

Moreover, the Health and Safety Code requires that human

11

tissue shall be disposed of following the conclusion of

12

scientific use, normally by interment or incineration.

13

Health & Safety Code S 7054.4 (West Supp. 1989).

14

this statutory requirement, it would have been reasonable for Mr.

15

Moore to expect that Defendants would dispose of his tissues

16

after their examination.

17

reasonable to expect that Defendants would commercially exploit

18

his unique biological material without his knowledge or consent.

19

Abandonment requires a total indifference as to the

In light of

It would certainly not have been

20 disposition of one's property.
21

Cal.

Mr. Moore expressly refused to

grant Defendants the rights to his tissues, and maintained

22 reasonable expectations as to their use and disposition.
23 facts are sufficient to dispute Defendants' claim that he
24 Intended to abandon his tissues, thereby precluding a
25 determination of abandonment as a matter of law.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
22

These

1

B.

2

Where Mr» Moore’s silence resulted from his
justifiable relianc;e on Defendants' misrepre
sentations, Defendants are estopped from asserting
that this silence constituted abandonment.

3
4

As a result of Defendants' misrepresentations to Mr. Moore,

5

they are estopped from claiming that Mr. Moore's failure to give

6

specific instructions as to the disposition of his tissues

7

constitutes an intent to abandon.

8

that the party to be estopped has by false language or conduct

9

'led another to do that which he would not otherwise have done

"The essence of an estoppel is

10

and as a result thereof he has suffered injury.'"

11

Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp, appeals Bd., 40 Cal. 3d 5, 16 (1985)

12

(citation omitted).

13

1.

State Comp.

Defendants made numerous misrepresentations to
Mr. Moore concerning the medical necessity of
the withdrawals and their knowledge of commercial
activity related to his biological material.

14
15
16

Throughout Mr. Moore's treatment. Defendants stated to him

17

that the withdrawals of his tissue were necessary for his health

18

and well-being.

19

nis spleen, "none of these samples or specimens . . . were used

20

cy Defendants to further or improve his health and well-being."

21

[C.T. 13.)

(C.T. 12.)

However, aside from the removal of

In fact. Defendants used these tissues "solely to

22 further [their own] independent research purposes."
23

(C.T. 13.)

Defendants also stated to Mr. Moore that they were engaged

24

-n strictly academic and purely scientific research in an effort

25

:o determine the cause of, and a possible cure for, his disease.

26

C.T. 13.)

27

n the process of conducting non-therapeutic and commercial

28

•esearch which was totally independent of Mr. Moore's medical

These representations were made while Defendants were

23

I
2

care.

(C.T. 12-13.)
Defendants also made repeated misrepresentations concerning

3

the commercial potential of '^r. Moore's tissues.

4

pointedly asked the Defendants whether they had discovered

5

anything about his tissues which "was or might be presently or in

6

the future related to any scientific activity resulting in

7

commercial or financial benefits of any kind and in any amount."

8

(C.T. 14.)

9

same time they entered into negotiations and commercial contracts

Mr. Moore

Defendants denied any such discoveries, while at the

10

which concerned cell-lines and other products originating from

11

Mr. Moore's body.

12

(C.T. 19, 21-22.)

Most significantly, these representations were made while

13

Defendants were aware that published reports in biotechnology

14

industry publications were estimating a multi-billion dollar

15

market for products derived from Mr. Moore's tissues.

16

(C.T. 25.)

It should be noted that Defendant Golde misstates the facts

17

when he asserts that "[t]he record clearly shows that Mr. Moore

18

limited his inquiries to the use of his blood and other bodily

19 substances withdrawn subsequent to surgery."

20 at 24).

(Petitioner's brief

In fact, the complaint states that Mr. Moore's inquiries

21 concerned his "Blood and Bodily Substances," a term defined to

22 include his spleen.
23
24

2.

(C.T. 2, 13-14.)

Mr. Moore's reliance on Defendants’ false
representations caused him to refrain from
asserting his right to control the use of
his biological material.

25
26

The only logical inference that can be drawn from

27 Defendants' repeated misrepresentations is that they intended for
28 Mr. Moore to rely on them, and thereby refrain from asserting his
24

1

right to control the use of his tissues.

2

was denied compensation for his contribution to the products

3

derived from his tissues.

4

"To create an equitable estoppel,

Consequently, Mr. Moore

’it is enough if the party

5

has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such

6

action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his

7

position and saved himself from loss.'"

8

Accident Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 346, 349-350 (1945) (citation

9

omitted).

10
11

Benner v. Industrial

Benner, plaintiff's delay in asserting her workmen's
compensation claim was induced by her Justifiable reliance on the

12 defendants' conduct.

This court held that, as a result,

13

defendants were estopped from invoking a statute of limitations

14

defense to plaintiff's claim.

Id. at 350.

15

Mr. Moore has stated that, had he been aware of Defendants'

16

non-therapeutic and commercial use of his tissues, he would have

17

conditioned his consent to their removal on his continued control

18

and just compensation.

However, Defendants' misrepresentations

19 lulled Mr. Moore into believing that they were acting in

20 accordance with his desires, and therefore he made no objections
21 and gave no specific instructions concerning the use of his

22 biological material.
23
24
25
26

3.

Defendants' fiduciary duty to Mr, Moore,
and the duty of full and fair disclosure
they created by undertaking to speak,
justify Mr. Moore’s reliance on their
representations.

There is no question that Mr. Moore was justified in relying

27 on Defendants' representations.

The law recognizes a fiduciary

28 relationship between a physician and patient which requires the
25

1

physician "to make a full and fair disclosure to [the patient] of

2

all facts which materially affect . . . his rights and

3

interests."

4

(1947).

5

Bowman v. McPhesters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800

In Bowman, the cause of action was based on the physician's

6

fraudulent concealment of material facts concerning the extent of

7

injuries which served as the basis of the patient's malpractice

8

claim.

9

fraudulent concealment prevented the patient from discovering the

Id. at 797.

The court held that the physician's

10

relevant facts and therefore the physician was estopped from

11

asserting a statute of limitations defense.

12

id. at 804.

In the instant case. Defendants' statements as to the

13

necessity of the withdrawals for Mr. Moore's health and well

14

being related directly to his medical care.

15

reliance was justified based on this fiduciary relationship.

Therefore, his

16

Defendants' denial of knowledge of any commercial potential

17

or activities should also be included under this fiduciary duty.

18 With the recent development of the biotechnology industry, a huge
19 commercial potential has been realized in the human body.

20 However, the public is largely ignorant of this potential,
21

allowing researchers to enjoy a free supply of patient tissue.

22 See Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra p. 19, at 227.
23

Insofar as this commercial potential may be a factor in the

24 patient's decision to permit the removal of bodily tissues, a
25 physician's fiduciary duty should require full and fair
26 disclosure of the economic as well as the health aspects of any
27 such decision.

Therefore, Defendants' misrepresentations

28 concerning their knowledge of the commercial potential of Mr.
26

1

Moore's biological material should be deemed a breach of a

2

fiduciary duty, upon which Mr. Moore was entitled to rely.

3

Should the court not so interpret the scope of Defendants'

4

fiduciary duty, Mr. Moore's reliance was still justified based

5

upon the duty of full and fair disclosure created when Defendants

6

undertook to speak.

7

to speak or disclose facts, one who does speak must speak the

8

whole truth, and not by partial suppression or concealment make

9

the utterance wrongful or misleading."

"Regardless of whether one is under a duty

American Trust Co. v.

10

California Western States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 65

11

(1940).

12

This policy is also recognized by the statutory definition

13

of deceit, which includes "[t]he suppression of a fact, by one

14

who is bound to disclose it or who gives information of other

15

facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of

16

that fact."

17

Cal. Civ. Code S 1710.3 (West 1985).

By representing to Mr. >^oore that they were engaged in

18 strictly academic and purely scientific research. Defendants
19 created a duty for themselves of full disclosure as to their

20 activities.

They breached this duty by concealing their

21 negotiations, commercial contracts, and patent applications.
22 They further breached this duty by denying that there was any
23 commercial potential associated with Mr. Moore's tissues while at
24 the same time they conducted commercial research and were aware
25 of industry projections of the huge market potential for products
26 derived from his tissues.
27

As a result of Mr. Moore's justifiable reliance on these

28 misrepresentations, he did not object to Defendants' activities.
27

1

nor give specific instructions as to the use and disposition of

2

his biological material.

3

silence, they are estopped from asserting that it constitutes

4

proof that Mr. Moore abandoned his tissues.

5

III. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. MOORE NEVER CONSENTED TO
THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF HIS TISSUES, AND ANY
SUCH CONSENT WOULD HAVE BEEN VITIATED BY DEFENDANTS'
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS.

6

As Defendants are responsible for this

7

8
9

Mr. Moore's consent to removal of his tissues would be a
viable defense if he were claiming that the removal constituted a

10

conversion.

11

770, 789 (1952) (consent is ordinarily a defense to a charge of

12

conversion).

13

removal, but from Defendants exceeding the scope of his consent

14

by using his tissues for their own commercial benefit.

15

See Klett v. Se^rurlty Acceptance Co., 38 Cal. 2d

However, Mr. Moore's claim arises not from the

16

A. The facts alleged do not support Defendants' claim
that Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial
exploitation of his spleen or other bodily tissues.

17

On the facts alleged in the complaint, there is no basis for

18

determining that Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial

19 exploitation of his spleen.

The consent form for the splenectomy

20 is not a part of the record and therefore the scope of this
21

consent cannot be decided on a demurrer.

Rather, it should be

22 reserved for trial, where the limits of Mr. Moore's express
23 consent can be determined on the basis of physical and
24 testimonial evidence.
25

Nor is there any evidence in the record which indicates that

26 Mr. Moore expressly consented to commercial exploitation of his
27 tissues removed on subsequent visits.

In fact, it was not until

28 Defendants had conducted seven years of independent commercial
28

1

research that they sought this express consent.

2

opportunity, Mr. Moore expressly declined to relinquish his

3

commercial rights to his tissues and any products which might be

4

derived from them.

5

such consent, the Defendants proceeded to commercially exploit

6

the tissues removed on the very day he denied them those rights.

7

Given the

Yet, even after Mr. Moore expressly withheld

B. Defendants* concealment of their commercial research
and the market potential of Mr. Moore*s biological
material make a finding of implied consent to
commercial exploitation unreasonable.

8
9

10

Any assertion that there was an implied consent to

11

Defendants' commercial activities is without merit.

12

times, the Defendants concealed from Mr. Moore that they were

13

involved in commercial research and that there was any commercial

14

potential associated with his tissues.

15

concealment, the fact that Mr. Moore did not expressly forbid

16

commercial exploitation until September 1983, does not imply that

17

he consented to commercial exploitation before that time.

18

Moreover, it is logically inconsistent to assume that Mr. Moore

19

impliedly consented to commercial exploitation of his tissues,

At all

In light of Defendants'

20 when he expressly refused to grant such consent on the only
21

occasion that such a possibility was revealed to him.

22

24

C. Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations
concerning their kno;>;ledge of any commercial
potential and activities associated with Mr.
Moore's tissues, vitiate any express or implied
consent to their comTierclal exploitation.

25

"[C]onsent, in law, is "nore than a mere formal act of the

23

26 mind.

It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even

27 mistake."

Freedman v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 56 Cal. 2d 454,

28 457 (1961) (citation omitted).
29

In Freedman, the insured jeweler

1

was fraudulently induced to hand over diamonds to an

2

impersonator.

3

defendant insurance company, the defendant contended that a

4

conversion had not occurred because the insured had consented to

5

the transfer.

6

conversion where that consent was procured by fraud.

7

When the jeweler sought to recover from the

This court held that consent did not negate the

For a statement to be fraudulent, one must show;

Id.
(1) a

8

representation as to a material fact? (2) the representation was

9

false and known to be false by the party making it; (3) the

10

statement was made with the intent to induce the other party to

11

do or refrain from doing some act; (4) another party relied on

12

the statement; (5) that the relying party was ignorant of the

13

falsity of the representation and reasonably believed it to be

14

true; and (6) that the relying party thereby suffered damage or

15

injury.

16

Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations meet these

17

requirements.

34 Cal. Jur. 3d Fraud and Deceit S 6 (1977).

18

First, Defendants' statements concerned material facts.

19

Moore did not simply ask Defendants if they knew the value of his

Mr.

20 tissues, he asked if they had any knowledge of past, present, or
21

potential scientific activity resulting in commercial or

22 financial benefits of any kind.

(C.T. 14.)

That Defendants

23

themselves were conducting commercial research shows that this

24

was a question of verifiable fact, not opinion.

25

truth. Defendants deprived Mr, Moore of information which would

By hiding the

26 have been material to him, both in deciding whether or not to
27 consent to commercial exploitation, and in determining the
28 direction and scope of his medical treatment.
30

1

Second, Defendants' denials of such knowledge were false and

2

they knew them to be false.

3

in negotiations and were thenselves conducting commercial

4

research.

5

own actions.

6

Defendants were at the time engaged

They must certainly be charged with knowledge of their

Third, the facts alleged lead to the conclusion that

7

Defendants intended to induce Mr. Moore into refraining from

8

asserting his rights to control the use of his tissues.

9

concern could not have been that Mr. Moore would have forgone

Their

10

the withdrawals, thereby jeopardizing his treatment, because none

11

of the tissues withdrawn on the subsequent visits were ever used

12

to improve his health and well-being.

13

Defendants' own benefit.

14

Rather, they were used for

Fourth, Mr. Moore relied on Defendants' misrepresentations.

15

He has stated that, had he been aware of the truth, he would have

16

conditioned his consent to removal on his continued control and

17

just compensation.

18

Mr. Moore's reliance was justified based on a fiduciary

19

relationship and the duty of full and fair disclosure Defendants

As indicated in the analysis of abandonment,

20 created by undertaking to speak when they made their denials.
21

Fifth, Mr. Moore did not know, nor did he have any reason to
know, that Defendants' statements were false.

(C.T. 27.)

Mr.

Moore lived several hundred miles from Defendants' facilities and
his visits were for short periods, spread out over seven years.
His only reasonable method of obtaining information about his
tissues was to query those who removed them.
Finally, Mr. Moore has suffered damage in that he has been
deprived of any compensation for his contribution to a multi31

1

billion dollar industry based on his unique biological material.

2

Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations concerned facts

3

which would have been material to Mr. Moore in deciding whether

4

to consent to commercial exploitation of his tissues.

5

any such consent, either express or implied, is rendered

6

ineffective as a defense to 'ir. Moore's claim of conversion.

7

Therefore,

Defendant Golde's contention that Mr. Moore's consent to

8

surgery should be construed broadly is unpersuasive.

9

a North Carolina case when he asserts that, in the absence of

Golde cites

10

proof to the contrary, a patient's consent to medical treatment

11

should be construed as general in nature.

12

31).

13

expansive meaning to the holding than is warranted.

14

case, the North Carolina court was referring to the fact that, in

15

major surgery, neither the patient nor the surgeon can know the

16

patient's exact condition until the incision has been made.

17

Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 362, 90 S.E.2d 754, 759 (1956).

18

The court held that, in such a case, the consent "will be

19

construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend the

(Petitioner's brief at

These words, taken out of context, ascribe a far more
In the cited

20 operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the
21 area of the original incision whenever he, in the exercise of his
sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical
procedure dictates and requires such an extension."

id.

(emphasis added).
Authorization to remedy an abnormal or diseased condition,
discoverable only during surgery, does not imply an authorization
to engage in nonconsensual, commercial exploitation of a
patient's biological material.
32

Moreover, such a broad

1

construction of consent direDtly contravenes the long-established

2

doctrine of contra proferentem.

3

case of uncertainty, an agreement is to be interpreted against

4

the drafter.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 206 (1979).

5
6

This doctrine holds that, in the

CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore urges this court to recognize his right to control

7

the ultimate use and disposition of his unique and commercially

8

valuable biological material.

9

permitting physicians, researchers, and biotechnology firms to

10

commercially exploit his unique genetic material, would clearly

11

lead to incongruous and untenable results.

12

acknowledge this most basic right can only breed mistrust and

13

abuse in the physician-patient relationship by denying patient-

14

donors any compensation for their contribution, while permitting

15

others to profit thereby.

16

exercise its inherent authority to recognize this fundamental

17

right based upon the well-established doctrines of property and

18

contract law which govern the acquisition and transfer of all

To deny him this right, while

Refusal to

To the contrary, this court should

19 things of value.

20

Defendants told Mr. Moore that the withdrawals were

21 necessary for his health and well-being, while they used his

22 tissues solely for their own financial benefit.

They repeatedly

23 told him that they were involved in strictly academic and purely
24 scientific research, while they entered into commercial contracts
25 and obtained a patent on a valuable cell-line derived from his
26 unique tissues.

In essence. Defendants told Mr. Moore what they

27 thought he wanted to hear, while they did what they wanted to do.
28 In this manner, they all but guaranteed that he would raise no
33

1

objections.

2

silence constituted abandonment would not only deny Mr. Moore

3

justice in the instant case, it would also erode the physician-

4

patient relationship.

5

from asserting the affirmative defense of abandonment.

6

To allow Defendants to then claim that Mr. Moore’s

Therefore, Defendants should be estopped

Initially, the Defendants did not request Mr. Moore's

7

consent to the commercial use of his tissues.

8

tissues anyway.

9

withheld it.

They used his

Defendants then asked for his consent and he

Undaunted, they continued their commercial

10

exploitation of his biological material.

11

had no knowledge of any commercial activities related to his

12

tissues, even though they were engaged in these same activities.

13

Defendants said they

The record shows that Mr. Moore never consented to

14

Defendants’ commercial exploitation of his tissues.

15

any such consent would have been vitiated by their fraudulent

16

misrepresentations.

17

law. Defendants' affirmative defense of consent must also fall.

18

Moreover,

Thus, having no support in the facts or in

Whereas the facts alleged in the complaint sufficiently

19 establish a cause of action in conversion, and Defendants have

20 failed to demonstrate the elements of either abandonment or
21 consent as a matter of law, the decision of the court of appeal

22 should be affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court.
23 Dated;
24
25
26
27
28

November 16, 1989
Respectfully Submitted,

